










   
Equilibria in Asymmetric Auctions with Entry 
by 













UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA 
Department of Economics 
1-1-1 Tennodai 
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8571 
JAPAN 




Regarding optimal design in the private value environment, there is an unsolved
discrepancy in the literature regarding asymmetric auctions and auctions with en-
dogenous participation; Literature on the former suggests that well-designed distortive
mechanisms are optimal (revenue maximizing) assuming the bidding costs are negli-
gible, while that on the latter insists that the mechanisms with free entry and no
distortion are optimal provided that the potential bidders are ex ante symmetric.
This paper is the rst attempt to reconcile the two views by establishing a model
for asymmetric auctions with costly participation. The main ndings are threefold;
First, an optimal outcome is possible if and only if the mechanism is ex post ecient.
Second, without any participation control, a coordination problem is likely in which
only the weak bidders participate and the strong bidders stay out. Finally, there is an
entry fee/subsidization scheme which, together with an ex post ecient mechanism,
induces the optimal outcome as a unique equilibrium.
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JEL classication: C72, D44, L22
1 Introduction
In high-valued asset or procurement auctions, the costs for preparing bids are typically
non-trivial. The costs each bidder incurs prior to bidding range from information acqui-
sition costs to transportation costs and even opportunity costs of awarding. Potential
bidders who anticipate that bidding is unprotable may hesitate to do so; therefore, de-
signing a mechanism that accounts for the bidder's endogenous participation is crucial for
the auction to be successful. The model of auction with endogenous entry has received
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1comprehensive analysis motivated by such practical situations faced by the auctioneer
(e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994),
Kjerstad and Vagstad (2000), Ye (2004)). Furthermore, empirical studies of auctions with
endogenous participation are growing following the development in the theoretical endoge-
nous participation models.1
The notable insights presented in the existing literature, however, crucially depend on
the assumption that all the potential bidders are ex ante identical. This strong assumption
may result in analyses being restrictive. Consider the case, for example, where a limited
number of bidders participate frequently but there are many other potential bidders who
rarely enter the auction. The question of whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers should
precommit to running a distortive auction to encourage entry by one-shot customers or
give up promoting competition and simply set an entry fee to extract more surplus from the
frequenters must be asked. The possibility that one-shot customers have a higher valuation
for an item must also be examined. Furthermore, it must be determined whether more
entries and stronger competition create higher revenue for the seller. The existing studies
provide an ambiguous prediction for auctions with asymmetric potential bidders.2
In this research, we provide the rst theoretical analysis for asymmetric auctions with
endogenous participation. The model we establish is an extension of the model of auctions
with costly participation, in which risk-neutral potential bidders randomize their partici-
pation in the auction. The bidders who actually enter incur a xed participation cost and
acquire their private information. In this formulation, we relax the symmetric assumption
in the following manner. First, we suppose that potential bidders consist of two groups and
that the bidders in each group participate in the auction with probability p1 for one group
and p2 for the other.3 The equilibrium we focus on in this paper is the type-symmetric
mixed-strategy entry equilibrium which is constituted by a pair of probabilities (p1;p2).
Second, we consider that the potential bidders in one group may be stronger than those in
the other group, i.e., the value distribution of a group of bidders stochastically dominates
that of the remaining bidders.4
It is shown that there is at least one and typically multiple type-symmetric equilibria.
1See e.g. Athey and Haile (2006).
2The theoretical model provided by Pevnitskaya (2003a) characterizes an equilibrium with asymmetric
bidders that assumes that dierent potential bidders have dierent risk attitudes. Pevnitskaya nds that
some bidders who are less risk-averse tend to participate in auctions more frequently than others in equi-
librium provided that each bidder's risk attitude is common knowledge. However, the equilibrium bidding
function analyzed in her study is essentially symmetric.
3Although the model considers only two groups, it can be extended to a case involving three or more
groups.
4There can be many forms of asymmetry. Our model does not restrict the form of asymmetry to
stochastic dominance.
2In some cases, a group of weak potential bidders enters with positive probability, and all
the strong bidders stay out in equilibrium. We then demonstrate that, if the mechanism
is ex post ecient, participation is always ecient in the sense that the expected marginal
contribution of an additional participant to social surplus equals the marginal costs for
participation. However, we also show that the \ecient entry" is not always optimal for
the seller and society. Due to the stochastic entry process, some equilibria are more likely
to end up with \too many" or \too few" bidders. These coordination costs are another
source of eciency loss, which makes all the ecient entry equilibria sub-optimal, except
one. In the case of symmetric potential bidders, for example, a symmetric equilibrium
creates the lowest revenue because of the highest coordination costs among equilibria.
It must be asked, therefore, how, when facing such a multiplicity problem, the auction-
eer induces optimal participation. Our model suggests that, by introducing a participation
fee/subsidization contingent on the realization of participation, the desired entry is always
induced as a unique equilibrium regardless of the form of asymmetry. Moreover, the
transfer scheme enables auctioneers to extract the entire surplus generated by the auc-
tion. Hence, sellers can implement the optimal entry by using a simple auction (English
or second-price sealed-bid auction) with a well-chosen monetary transfer scheme.
These ndings shed new light on the literature of auctions with asymmetric bidders as
well as auctions with endogenous participation; First, our results contradict the theorems
for an optimal design problem with a xed number of bidders, which assert that a positive
reservation price or some distortive allocation favoring a group of bidders improves revenue
for the seller (e.g., Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981), Bulow and Roberts
(1989), McAfee and McMillan (1989)). However, this argument ignores the point that the
rent extraction from a group of potential bidders could depress their participation. Our
results illustrate that ex post eciency is essential for ecient entry and, thus, for optimal
outcome, taking endogenous participation into account. It follows that any distortive
mechanism entails the sub-optimal outcome in asymmetric auctions with potential bidders.
Second, the optimality of ex post ecient mechanisms challenges the ranking theorems.
In asymmetric auctions, revenue ranking between rst- and second-price mechanisms is
generally ambiguous. This ambiguity, however, disappears, considering entry. We show
that, by asymmetry, rst-price auctions may attract more or fewer bidders, but the re-
sulting excessive or decient entry inicts a greater burden on the seller, who bears all the
participation costs. This story can easily be extended to the case of asymmetric auctions
with aliated private value (APV). Since aliation gives greater advantage to second-
price mechanisms, rst-price mechanisms are still dominated by second-price mechanisms
under the APV environment.
3Third, our model extends the theoretical analysis of auctions with endogenous par-
ticipation in several aspects. There are two groups of literature for auctions with costly
participation, investigating either an asymmetric equilibrium (e.g., McAfee and McMillan
(1987)) or a symmetric equilibrium (e.g., Levin and Smith (1994)). We provide a general
theory that analyzes both simultaneously. This enables us to obtain a ranking method for
social surplus and revenue across equilibria. Furthermore, the theorem is robust in cases
of heterogeneous potential bidders. The symmetry assumption is somewhat disturbing
since it is violated if it is common knowledge that some potential bidders are even slightly
likely to have higher valuation for the item.
Finally, our results provide a theoretical background for the experimental analysis
for auctions with endogenous participation. Pevnitskaya (2003b) observed evidence in
laboratory experiments that some subjects are more likely to participate than the others.
Since we show that the participation game is similar to a coordination game in which there
are multiple equilibria, such an outcome is possible as an equilibrium.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows; In Section 2 we describe the model.
The Discussion is provided in Section 6. Section 7 is the conclusion. Proofs are presented
in an appendix.
2 Model
Consider a risk-neutral seller auctions a single indivisible item to two groups of risk-neutral
potential bidders with unit demand. Suppose that there are N potential bidders in group
 2 f1;2g, and let N  f1; ;Ng denote the index set of group  potential bidders.
The transaction is described as a two-stage game. In the second stage, an auction
takes place with n = (n1;n2) actual bidders to allocate the item subject to an allocation
rule set by the auctioneer. In the rst stage, each potential bidder simultaneously makes
his or her decision to incur a xed participation cost c and enter the auction game.
Throughout this paper, we suppose private values, i.e., that one buyer's signal does
not aect the other's preferences. Each bidder draws his or her own signal denoted by ,
which is, without loss of generality, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The value of
the item for a bidder in group  is captured by the valuation function v : [0;1] ! <+,
which is strictly increasing and continuously dierentiable. Finally, the seller's value for
the item is normalized to equal zero.
The auction game consists of a set Bi
 2 B of bids for each bidder, an allocation rule
x(jn) : B ! [0;1]n, and a payment rule k(jn) : B ! Tn. If the ith bidder in group
 chooses a bid bi
 2 Bi






2 ), the bidder
4obtains the item with probability equal xi
(bjn) 2 [0;1] and makes the expected payment
ki
(bjn) to the seller.
The entry game begins with the seller's announcement on the assignment rule  =
(1;2) with  : n2N(bjn) and (bjn) = (1
(bjn);:::;n
 (bjn)), the payment rule
k = (k1;k2) with k : n2Nk(bjn) and k(bjn) = (k1
(bjn);:::;kn
 (bjn)), and the transfer
schedule y = (y1;y2) from the seller to the participants with y : n2Ny(n) for  = f1;2g.
Given f;k;yg, each of N1+N2 potential bidders simultaneously makes their entry decision
by assigning a probability pi
 on his or her entry. Those who actually participate in the
auction observe n, incur a participation cost c, obtain a monetary transfer y(n) and bid
following a Nash bidding strategy i
(jn).
Now, let i
(nj;k) denote the expected payo of a bidder in group  from the auction
prior to drawing his or her private information. Then, the net gain of the bidder from
participating in the auction, ui
(nj), is given by
ui
(nj;k;y) = i
(nj;k) + y(n)   c: (1)
Throughout the paper, we focus on the class of transfer schemes Y such that y(n) is
decreasing in n. We also suppose that (njx) is decreasing in n so that u(njx;y) is





 j)  0 > u(n
 +1;n
 j) for some  = f1;2g.5 To keep the model general, we
do not assume that the participation costs c must be moderate. Therefore, for some n
 ,
we could have n
 = 0 or n
 > N.
Hereafter, our analysis will proceed backward, beginning with the analysis of the
second-stage auction game. After we obtain the equilibrium bidding strategy and the
associated ex ante expected payos from the auction, we will investigate the entry deci-
sion in the rst stage.
3 The Nash bidding strategy in asymmetric auctions
By the Revelation Principle, the asymmetric auction analyzed here can be described as the
incentive-compatible (IC) direct-selling mechanism. Let  = (1
;:::;n
 ). Then, given a
report prole on signals  = (; ), a direct mechanism is characterized as an allocation
rule x(jn) = fxi
(jn)gi2n;2f1;2g and a payment rule () = fi
()gi2n;2f1;2g, where
xi
(t) 2 [0;1] is the probability with which the ith bidder in group  obtains the item and
i
(t) is the expected payment the bidder makes to the auctioneer when  is reported.
5Throughout, we assume that, for any function , the rst and second arguments for n1 and n2 are
exchangeable, i.e., (n1;n2j)  (n2;n1j)
5In our analysis, we focus on the class of the mechanism in which the assignment rule
x and the payment  for bidders in the same group are identical, respectively. In other
words, we have xi
  x, and i
   holds for all i. Hence, without using the superscript
i, let w be the conditional expected payo a group  bidder provided that his or her
signal equals i
. If the remaining n 1 participants report ( i
 ; ) truthfully, then the
envelope integral formula makes w satisfy
w(i






v(^ )x(^ jn)d^ :
Next, we derive the bidder's ex ante expected payo from the asymmetric auction prior
to drawing his or her signal i
. Since  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the
















v(^ )x(^ jn)d^ ; (2)
where we normalize w(0jn;x) = 0. If there is a unique Nash bidding strategy denoted
by (jn), then we have x(jn)  (()) for all  2 [0;1]n. Thus (nj)  (njx)
holds.
4 Type-symmetric entry equilibria
A type-symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all the bidders in the same
group assign an identical probability on their participation. Suppose that bidders in
group  except i enter the auction with probability p and each bidder in group  
enters the auction with probability p . In general, if Nt   k potential bidders in group t
enter the auction with probability pt and N t   ` potential bidders in group  t enter it
with probability p t, then the probability that the number of actual entrants is equal to











[pt]^ nt[1 pt]Nt k ^ nt[p t]^ n t[1 p t]N t ` ^ n t:
Therefore, provided that all the remaining potential bidders follow p 2 (p1;p2), the con-
ditional expected gain of the ith bidder in group  from participating in the auction
Ui
(p1;p2jx;y) is written as
68
> > > > > <
















^ n;p u2(^ n1; ^ n2 + 1jx2;y2);
(3)
where we omit N and c = (c1;c2) on Ui
 since these are exogenous throughout our research.
Given fx;yg, the ith bidder in group  will randomize his participation if and only if
U(p1;p2jx;y) = 0; otherwise, he will choose to enter or stay out as a pure strategy. To
clarify, let h : [0;1]N 1 [0;1]N  ! [0;1] be the best response entry decision of the ith





= 1 if fp1;p2jU(p1;p2j) > 0g
= 0 if fp1;p2jU(p1;p2j) < 0g
2 [0;1] if fp1;p2jU(p1;p2j) = 0g:
A type-symmetric mixed strategy entry equilibrium is characterized by a pair of prob-
abilities (p
1;p
2). Hence, the best response participation decision of the ith bidder in group







for all ) 2 f1;2g. In other words, if we dene A(p1;p2j)  h(p1;p2j)   p, then
p = (p1;p2) is a type-symmetric equilibrium if and only if A(pj) = 0 for all  = f1;2g.
Using this result, we have the following proposition which veries the existence of such
mixed-strategy equilibria in the asymmetric entry game.
Proposition 1. There exists at least one mixed-strategy type-symmetric entry equilibrium
in the participation game.
The proof given in the Appendix is absolutely in line with a regular proof of the
existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
5 The property of the entry equilibria
The following gures depict A as well as the mixed strategy entry equilibria as the
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~ p1
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Figure(b)
We dene ~ p such that U2(~ p1;0jx2;y2) = 0 and U1(0; ~ p2jx1;y1) = 0. In addition, we dene
 p such that U1( p1;0jx1;y1) = 0 and U2(0;  p2jx2;y2) = 0.
There are two types of mixed-strategy equilibria. To clarify, let G(pjx;y)  @p1=@p2jA=0
denote the absolute value of the slope of (10) on the p1-p2 square. Upon taking the total









if p 2 (0;1).
Let an \odd" mixed-strategy type-symmetric equilibrium be the equilibrium such that
G1(pjx;y) G2(pjx;y)  0, and let an \even" mixed-strategy type-symmetric equilibrium
be the equilibrium such that G1(pjx;y)   G2(pjx;y) < 0.
Since A() is continuous and non-increasing, the number of even equilibria is always
one fewer than the number of odd equilibria. Hence, by Proposition 1, there exists at
































^ n;p [u2(^ n1+1; ^ n2+1j)   u2(^ n1+1; ^ n2j)]:
8least one odd equilibrium and an even equilibrium exists if and only if there are multiple
equilibria. Furthermore, if all potential bidders are identical and y = 0, the symmetric
equilibrium is always even since G1(;) = N2=(N1   1) and G2(;) = (N2   1)=N1 for
any  2 (0;1).
To seek strategic interaction in the participation equilibrium, it is convenient to for-
mulate the relative strength between the two groups by the dierence in their expected
gain from participation as follows:
Denition 1. The group 1 potential bidders are more protable than the group 2 po-
tential bidders if and only if i) u1(n1 + 1;n2jx1;y1)  u2(n1;n2 + 1jx2;y2) holds for some
x and y and ii) u1(n1;n1jx1;y1)  u2(n1;n2jx2;y2) holds for such x and y.
Condition i) implies that the ex ante payo of a particular bidder is monotonically
increased by the change of his or her type from 2 to 1, whereas ii) implies that the ex
ante payo of a type 1 potential bidder is always greater than that of a type 2 bidder in
the auction. If the mechanisms are ex post ecient, a more protable bidder is equivalent
to a strong bidder in the sense that his or her value distribution stochastically dominates
the value distribution of a weak bidder.7 Then, one obtains the following lemma about an
equilibrium participation decision.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a potential bidder in one group is more protable than
a potential bidder in the other group for some mechanism and transfer scheme. Then,
the probability with which a less protable bidder enters the auction is greater than the
probability with which a more protable bidder enters the auction if each potential bidder
is indierent between participating and staying out in equilibrium.
See the Appendix for proof.
A symmetric equilibrium with ex ante identical bidders corresponds to the special case
in which the equations in condition i) and ii) hold with equality, as shown in Figure (a). On
the other hand, if asymmetry between two groups is suciently large, no even equilibrium
7If a mechanism is ex post ecient, we have










for any n. Hence, F1(v)  F2(v) for any v implies 1(n1 + 1;n2jx)  2(n1;n2 + 1jx). In addition, under





















for any n. Thus, if F1(v)  F2(v) for any v, then 1(n1;n2jx)  2(n1;n2jx).
9is likely. The marginal case is shown in Figure (b), in which an even equilibrium will
disappear if group 1 bidders become more protable.8
If potential bidders across groups are identical and c is moderate, there exist two
additional asymmetric equilibria. The asymmetric equilibrium analyzed by McAfee and
McMillan (1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) is the case in which p
 = 1 and p
  = 0
for some . Depending on N1 and N2, there could be many other asymmetric equilibria
e.g., p
1 = 1 and p
2 2 (0;1), as shown in Figure (b), where group 1 bidders obtain positive
expected rents.
The auctioneer has no reason to keep the bidders obtaining strictly positive rents. The
following lemma shows that full extraction of rents is trivially possible by an entry fee.




2;p;x2;y2) 2 <2 such that full extraction of rents is possible for some x 2 X and y 2 Y .
Moreover, y0
p;x;y implements the rent extraction by holding p constant.
Proof. Set y0
;p;x;y such that 0 = y0


















^ n;p [(^ n + 1; ^ n jx) + y + y0
;p;x;y   c]
= U(pjx;y + y0
;p;x;y);
for any p and x. x and p remain unchanged throughout.
A simple entry fee schedule, although it might be discriminatory, allows the seller to
extract full rents without disturbing equilibrium p. Therefore, the optimal design problem
in auctions with asymmetric potential bidders is equivalent to the maximization problem
of the social surplus.
The social surplus associated with the transaction here is dened as the winning bid-
der's valuation for the item minus the sum of participation costs incurred by participants.
Let (nj) be the incentive-compatible expected payment from the winning bidder to the
8Suciency for multiple equilibria is  p  ~ p for all . Intuitively, this is the case in which, if each
party commits to assigning its maximum probability  p, there is no room for the other group to participate
protably.








^ n;p[(^ n1; ^ n2jx) y(^ n1; ^ n2)]:









^ n;p[V(^ n1; ^ n2jx) (^ n1; ^ n2jx)+y(^ n1; ^ n2)] N1p1c1 N2p2c2;
where V () is the expected valuation of the winning bidder given ^ n1, ^ n2 and x. On the
other hand, the total surplus S() is given by








^ n;pV (^ n1; ^ n2jx)   N1p1c1   N2p2c2: (6)
By lemma 1, y0
;p;x;y enables the auctioneer to extract the bidder's rent at all for any p,
i.e., U(pjx;y0
p;x;y) = 0. Hence, we obtain
S(pjx) = R(pjx;y0
p;x;y):
This implies that, if the seller sets a monetary transfer scheme such that bidder's rent is
zero, then the seller's revenue is identical to the social surplus for any mechanism.
In addition, (6) may remind us of the revenue equivalence theorem for asymmetric
bidders with entry, as described in the following statement:
Theorem 1. Suppose that the bidder's rent is fully extracted. If any two mechanisms have
the same probability assignment functions and induce equal entry, then the two mechanisms
generate the same revenue for the seller.
This determines that the pure transfer y is redundant for the expected revenue as long
as rents are fully extracted and the equilibrium entry p is unchanged. It follows that
auctioneers have many alternative transfer schedules y that do not inuence p.
In the reminder of this section, we explore the maximization problem over S(pjx) to
nd the upper bound of social surplus ^ S. Among the arguments on S, we rst investigate
x and then control p to seek ^ S. It is trivially true that any ex post ineciency stemming
from distortive allocation or a positive reservation price decreases the social surplus.
11Proposition 3. Let x represent the ex post ecient mechanisms. For any p 2 [0;1] 
[0;1], the social surplus is maximized if and only if the mechanism is ex post ecient,
namely for any p S(pjx) > S(pjx) 8 x  Xnx.
Proof. V (njx)  V (njx) holds for any x  X. Hence, by (6), S(pjx)  S(pjx) holds for
any p.
After focusing on ex post ecient mechanisms, we can discuss a useful theorem for
equilibrium analysis as follows. This theorem provides a relationship between the ex ante
payo for each potential bidder and the expected marginal contribution to the social
surplus of the bidder.
Theorem 2. Let v
(1)
 be the highest valuation among group  bidders. Let (jx) be a
matching function such that the bidder with v
(1)
 and the bidder with v
(1)
  tie under some




 jx). Suppose that (v)  v for some . Then,
for any n,
(
1(n1+1;n2jx) = V (n1+1;n2jx)   V (n1;n2jx);
2(n1;n2+1jx) = V (n1;n2+1jx)   V (n1;n2jx);
(7)
if and only if (v) = v.
See the Appendix for proof. This property is rst introduced by Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1993) in an IPV setting. We extend the results to the asymmetric private value envi-
ronment and give a sucient condition for this property to hold. Most standard auc-
tions satisfy the condition (v)  v. For example, in asymmetric rst-price auc-
tions with a strong bidder and a weak bidder, we have (v) > v, which suggests
that (7) does not hold.9 On the other hand, second-price auctions with a positive and
constant reservation price satisfy (v) = v. Such examples assure that ex post ef-
ciency in allocation is not necessary for the marginal contribution theorem to hold as
shown in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993). Obviously, the amount of contribution by one
more additional bidder under the ex post inecient mechanism is strictly smaller since
V (n+1;n jx)   V (n;n jx) > V (n+1;n jx)   V (n;n jx) for any x 2 Xnfxg.
Now we return to the maximization problem of S. Taking a partial derivative of S
9Suppose that there are two bidders j = f1;2g whose value distribution is Fj(v) on [ v;v] and fj(v)
denotes the corresponding density. Assume that lnFj(v) is supermodular. Let j be the equilibrium bidding
functions. The range of the equilibrium bidding functions should be identical so that 1( v) = 2( v) holds.
12characterized in (6) with respect to p gives the rst-order condition as follows
8
> > > > > <




















^ n;p [V (n1;n2+1jx)   V (n1;n2jx)]   N2c2:
(8)
Note that the second derivative is negative under the ex post ecient mechanism.10 Then,
by Theorem 2, (8) can be rewritten as
8
> > > > > <




















^ n;p [2(n1;n2+1jx)   c2]:
(9)
Recall that (9) coincides with A(jx
;0). Therefore, (9) vanishes if (p
1;p
2) 2 (0;1)(0;1)
and @S(pjx;)=@p  0 or @S(pjx;)=@p  0 if p
 = 0 or 1. This implies that the social
gain from an incremental change in p equals the social cost of an incremental change in
the probability for each .11 We thus establish the following proposition about ecient
entry.
Proposition 4. Suppose that a mechanism is ex post ecient and involves no transfer.
Then, the bidder's prot-maximizing entry decision is the necessary and sucient condi-
tion for ecient entry in the sense that the social gain from entry equals the cost of the
entry.
The result is quite reasonable, as we already know that the bidder's expected payo
is identical to the marginal contribution to the social surplus under x. Since the agent's
problem is the same as the society's problem, the bidder's rational participation decision
leads to an ecient outcome in the entry.
The sucient condition for our maximization problem is a little more involved than
that in the symmetric case. The following lemma demonstrates that, as a result of Hessian





1 < 0. Under the ex post ecient mechanism, V (n1 +2;n2jx
;)   2V (n1 +
1;n2jx
;) + V (n1;n2jx
;) = 1(n1+1;n2jx
;)   1(n1;n2jx









n2d, where ()  v
 1
 (v()) is a matching function. Then,







n2d < 0. The





11In addition, if the gain is greater (or less) than the costs, deterministic participation (or staying out)
occurs.
13intersection between A() if the mechanism is ex post ecient without monetary transfer.
Lemma 2. If x = x and y = 0, then odd equilibria form a local maximum and even
equilibria form a saddle point on the social welfare function S(pjx).
See the Appendix for proof. Again, the linkage between A() and S(pjx) is shown here
under the ex post ecient mechanisms with no transfer. The proof demonstrates that the
gradient of S(pjx) is determined by the positional relationship between A1() and A2().
If an analysis focuses on a symmetric equilibrium with ex ante symmetric bidders,
eciency and optimality in an entry are equivalent. Taking into account multiple equilib-
ria, however, an ecient entry may not be the optimal entry. Dierent equilibria create
dierent level of social surplus due to the dierence in coordination costs associated with
the randomness of the actual number of participants. Lemma 2 implies that even equilib-
ria entail more waste of social welfare than odd equilibria and, hence, lower revenue. For
instance, the symmetric equilibrium in a case of symmetric potential bidders suers the
highest coordination costs among three equilibria.
There is at least one odd equilibrium in asymmetric auctions with endogenous partic-
ipation. In addition, in the case of multiple equilibria, one of the odd equilibria yields the
highest social welfare. Hence, ^ S is achieved at an odd equilibrium under ex post ecient
mechanisms. The following proposition addresses the question of whether this occurs only
in the case of ex post ecient mechanisms.
Proposition 5. The social surplus created in an odd equilibrium attains ^ S if the mecha-
nism is ex post ecient and no transfer is used. Ecient entry is necessary for socially
optimal entry, but not sucient.
Proof. Proof for the \if " part is obvious by proposition 3. The proof for the \only if " part
is shown as follows. Let ^ px denote the maximizer for S(pjx) for any x. By construction,
S(^ px
jx)  S(pjx) for any p. By proposition 3, S(^ pxjx) > S(^ pxjx) for any x 6= x.
Hence, S(^ px
jx) > S(^ pxjx) for any x 6= x.
We conclude this section by considering implementation in the entry game with mul-
tiple equilibria. The auctioneer has two devices to inuence entry i.e., x and y. For
example, setting a discriminatory reservation price which favors a group of bidders aects
A() and, hence, the equilibrium formulation. In addition, bidding credits may help a
particular group of potential bidders to participate more frequently and discourage the
remaining bidders' participation. Furthermore, monetary transfer y enables the seller to
control A() or extract more surplus from a group of bidders. The question of whether
the auctioneer should choose any x 6= x to reach the best equilibrium must then be asked.
14The following lemma illustrates that the seller can implement any p as a unique equi-
librium by controlling y 2 Y . 12
Lemma 3. Given x 2 X, there exists a set of transfer schedule ^ Yp;x;y with which any p
will be induced as a unique mixed-strategy entry equilibrium.
See the Appendix for proof. Recall lemma 1 insisting that full rent extraction is
possible at any p by any y0
p;x;y 2 Y 0
p;x;y. Furthermore, we already know that ^ S is never
achieved unless the mechanism is ex post ecient in proposition 5. Hence, the optimal
mechanism in auctions with asymmetric potential bidders involves a participation control,
as reported in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The participation game has a unique mixed-strategy type-symmetric equi-
librium in which the auctioneer's revenue is maximized if and only if the auctioneer em-
ploys the ex post ecient mechanism with an appropriately chosen transfer scheme.
Proof. By lemma 3, there is a set of ^ y that induces ^ p as a unique odd equilibrium. Further-
more, if type  potential bidders have positive expected rents, the auctioneer can extract
them by setting ^ y0
 = ^ y +y0
. Let ^ y0 = (^ y0
; ^ y0
 ). Then, by lemma 3, ^ y and ^ y0 induce the
same entry if and only if it is unique.
5.1 Aliated Private Value
Suppose that there exists b(vjx) for some x such that the bidder who has the highest b
wins the item. Dene (vjx) = b 1



















= V (n1;n2jx) V (n1 1;n2jx);
which extends theorem 2 to an aliated private-value (APV) paradigm. Now, we have
extended the results to the asymmetric APV environment.
6 Discussion
We show that, if endogenous participation is accounted for, ex post eciency is necessary
for an optimal mechanism. The results contradict the existing theorems for optimal design
12This is primarily because y is a function of n1 and n2 rather than a negative constant variable i.e., a
xed entry fee. However, nothing would be gained in the symmetric model if y is a function of n.
15with a xed set of asymmetric bidders, which insist that ex post ecient mechanisms are
not optimal (See Myerson (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1989), and Bulow and Roberts
(1989)). Our model illustrates that the costs of introducing a distortive assignment rule for
rent extraction always outweigh the benets due to a serious ineciency in participation.
Proposition 6 also impacts the ranking theorems with IPV asymmetric auctions. Vick-
rey (1961) showed that there is no general ranking between rst and second-price asymmet-
ric auctions, if the number of bidders is exogenously determined.13 Considering endoge-
nous participation, we obtain a clear ranking. Second-price mechanisms always dominate
rst-price mechanisms. In addition, Milgrom and Weber (1982) suggests that second-price
mechanisms yield higher revenue than rst-price ones if signals are aliated. Therefore,
our proposition about the superiority of second-price mechanisms still holds in the case of
asymmetric APV environments.
The proposition in which ecient entry is a necessary condition for optimal outcome
is also referred to in Levin and Smith (1994).14 They address the issue that when more
potential bidders exceed the point of transition between pure- and mixed-entry strategies,
the result is a waste of social welfare.15 Our approach is a non-trivial extension from
Levin and Smith (1994), since we provide a generalized scheme that makes it possible to
evaluate revenue across equilibria with asymmetric potential bidders.
For ways of promoting competition in asymmetric auctions with participation, our
analysis relates to Ayres and Cramton (1996) and Gilbert and Klemperer (2000). Moti-
vated by auctioneers' concern about insucient competition among well-qualied bidders,
their studies explore whether subsidizing weak buyers through a distortive allocation rule
increases revenue. Both conclude that promoting entry by weak buyers will enhance rev-
enue. Since an even equilibrium is a saddle point on S(jx), the change of an allocation
13The existence of an equilibrium bidding function in asymmetric rst-price auctions with a xed number
of bidders is shown by Lebrun (1999). In general, weak bidders would bid more aggressively than strong
bidders in the rst-price auction, resulting in ex post inecient allocation. See Maskin and Riley (2000).
14Ye (2004) also shows the advantage of asymmetric equilibrium by using Jensen's inequality. However,
the results are crucially dependent upon the assumption that potential bidders are ex ante identical.
15This argument is true without a symmetry assumption if the mechanisms are ex post e-
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If x = x
, then, by theorem 2, both are equal to zero. This indicates that, if a potential bidder, regardless
of its type, is eliminated and the remaining potential bidders still use p, then social welfare is unchanged.
If the remaining potential bidders choose p
0 according to their new best response, which accounts one fewer
potential bidders, then, social surplus increases by construction.
16rule from x to some x0 may induce another p, which creates greater S despite some ef-
ciency loss in allocation. However, our study suggests that the outcome is sub-optimal.
The rst best outcome is achieved only through an ex post ecient allocation with a pure
transfer.
A transfer may often be seen in the real-world procurement auction as the requirement
for a higher nancial guarantee for bidders. It is costly for bidders but benecial to the
auctioneer by reducing the risk of facing default. Government spending for improving
small business access can also be considered to be a transfer. An important aspect of
participation control, which includes an implicit one, is that any change in participation
from the optimal equilibrium results in both eciency loss due to coordination costs and
uctuation in participation.
7 Conclusion
Over the past decade, the model of auctions with endogenous participation has provided
a striking result, namely, that both eciency and revenue maximization can be achieved
simultaneously. Despite the contribution of endogenous participation models, they depend
heavily on the assumption that the potential bidders are ex ante the same. Little progress
has been made in the theory of auction with asymmetric endogenous entry.
The relaxation of symmetric assumption is not a trivial extension from the existing
symmetric model. First, with symmetric bidders, optimal design problems boil down to
the optimal choice of a reservation price, as investigated in Riley and Samuelson (1981).
Introducing asymmetry, the optimal design problem becomes more complicated. As dis-
covered in Myerson (1981), the appropriately chosen distortive mechanisms enhance rev-
enue. This proposition, however, absolutely ignores the eects of a potential bidder's
participation. Accounting for the rational decision of a potential bidder's participation,
any rent extraction by distortive allocation causes inecient entry, and, hence, simple
auctions are optimal. The results provide a new interpretation for the widespread use of
simple auctions.
Second, the endogenous entry model becomes applicable to a more general environ-
ment. In procurement auctions for international projects, for example, a number of con-
tractors randomly participate. Based on the fact that traveling costs as well as currency
values dier from country to country, it is impossible to suppose that all potential bid-
ders are ex ante the same. Almost all empirical models for auctions with endogenous
participation, so far, have been based on the symmetric assumption (e.g. Li and Zheng
(2006)). We hope that our model contributes to the enrichment of the empirical analysis
17for auctions with endogenous participation.
Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1
Dene H(p j) : [0;1] ! [0;1] as the solution of (4) for p. Since Ui










(0;p j) < 0g, and p000
  2 fp jUi























In other words, if we dene H(pj) = 2f1;2gH(p j), a type-symmetric equilibrium
p = (p
1;p
2) is a xed point of H i.e., p 2 H(pjx;y).
u(nj) is decreasing in n. Since n follows a binomial distribution, U is continuous.
Hence, by (10), H(p j) is continuous. For each  the set H(p ) is nonempty and has
a closed graph since H() is continuous. Thus, by the xed-point theorem, there exists
at least one xed point on H. A mixed-strategy equilibrium is a xed point.
18Proof for Proposition 2
By the characteristic of binomial distribution, the following identities hold:
8
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^ n;p [p1u2(^ n1+1; ^ n2+1j)+(1 p1)u2(^ n1; ^ n2+1j)]:
(11)































^ n2P^ nu1(^ n1 +1; ^ n2). Since,








^ n2P^ nu1(^ n1 + 1; ^ n2) < 0, one
must obtain p2  p1. Equality holds if both u1(n1 + 1;n2 + 1) = u2(n1 + 1;n2 + 1) and
u1(n1 + 1;n2) = u2(n1;n2 + 1) hold for all n.
Proof for Lemma 3
Suppose, by contradiction, that the set ^ Y is empty. Set y1 = ~ y1 such that u1(n1 +1;n2 +
1jx1; ~ y1)   u1(n1 + 1;n2jx1; ~ y1) = 0 and u1(n1 + 2;n2jx1; ~ y1)   u1(n1 + 1;n2jx1; ~ y1) > 0.
Then, G1(pjx1; ~ y1) = 0 for any p. Moreover, set y2 = ~ y2 such that u2(n1;n2 + 2jx2; ~ y2)  
u2(n1;n2 + 1jx2; ~ y2) > 0 and u2(n1 + 1;n2 + 1jx2; ~ y2)   u2(n1 + 1;n2jx2; ~ y2) = 0. Then,
G2(pjx2; ~ y2) ! 1 for any p. Since G1 < G2, ~ y = (~ y1; ~ y2) 2 ^ Y , we have reached a
contradiction. Thus ^ Y is nonempty.
Let ^ y 2 ^ Y . Set y0
(p) =  U(pjx; ^ y) for some p. Then, U(pjx; ^ y + y0
(p)) = 0 for
any p. Since y0
(p) is constant for all n, G1(pjx1; ^ y1 + y0
1) < G2(pjx2; ^ y2 + y0
2) for any x.
Hence, ^ y(p) + y0(p) 2 ^ Y .
19Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose that there exists b(vjx) for some x such that the bidder who has the
highest b wins the item. Dene (vjx) = b 1




















where F() = v 1
 () and f() = F0
(). Integral by parts yields the last equality. Since
^ F1(vjx) = F1(2(v)), ^ F1(1(v)) = F1(2(1(v))) = F1(v) and 2(1(v)) = v1(v), letting
1(v) = ^ v, it is possible to obtain
Z
v(F1(v))n1[( ^ F2(vjx))n2]0dv =
Z





















[2(v) v][1  ^ F1(vjx)]( ^ F1(vjx))n1 1[(F2(v))n2]
0 dv=1(n1;n2jx):
(v) = v for any v under the ex post ecient mechanism. Therefore, the third term
on the left-hand side vanishes if x = x. Clearly, the term is typically non-zero for any
x  Xnfxg.
Proof for Lemma 2
Since @2S(pjx;)=@p2 < 0, the rst-order principle minor of the Hessian on S(pj) is
negative.

































^ n;p [V (n1;n2+2j)   2V (n1;n2+1j) + V (n1;n2j)]


























^ n;p [2(n1+1;n2jx) 2(n1;n2jx)] by Lemma 2, is positive if and only
if G1(pj) G2(pj) > 0. Hence, the even equilibrium is a saddle point. Finally, we show that
S(p1;p2jx;U1(p1;p2) = 0) is increasing in p1 if and only if U1(p1;p2jx) > U2(p1;p2jx).
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist p0
1 and p0
2 such that S(p0
1;p0
2jx)jA1=0 is decreas-
ing in p1. Since U2() is continuous in p2, there exists some p00
2 < p0











Since U1() is continuous in p1, there exists p00 > p0 such that U1(p00
1;p00













2jx), which leads to contradiction.
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